SluijsensandClaude Opus 5
8e79a72340
U4. Console logging plus Sentry, a same-origin tunnel so ad blockers cannot silence browser errors, Umami on the admin SPA, and six security events that alert rules can actually be built on. The correlation id is the W3C trace id from the ambient Activity, enabled by one line of ActivityTrackingOptions so every entry from every category carries it without touching a call site. It propagates across the master/slave boundary via traceparent, which TraceIdentifier cannot do at all, and it is the same value ProblemDetails already returns to the browser. The security events use source-generated LoggerMessage with constant templates. Sentry groups log events by message, so interpolating an email address would give every address its own issue and "more than 20 failed logins in five minutes" could never fire — the events would arrive, be visible, be tagged, and the alerting would silently be impossible. A test asserts the rendered message is identical across argument values. Scrubbing happens in-process, before transmission, and covers Set-Cookie as well as Cookie: the login response issues the refreshToken there, so scrubbing only the request side would protect nothing. Transactions are scrubbed too, because they carry request data and are the channel nobody thinks of. The tunnel derives its destination from the DSN once at startup and reads nothing from the request, which is what separates a tunnel from a server-side request forgery primitive. Size is capped by a bounded read rather than by trusting Content-Length, and the endpoint is rate limited. Two things found along the way. Zod 4's url() hands the value to the URL constructor, which accepts any scheme — so the existing frontend validation would have accepted the exact "htp://" typo BR-U4-24 names, and the SPA would have called a nonexistent origin. Now constrained to http(s). And the new appsettings comments are verified against the real configuration provider, because the failure mode if it rejected them is both hosts refusing to start after a release switch. One deviation. IAdminTokenValidator was meant to gain a reason-reporting overload; implemented that way, a substitute returning false by default silently inverted the access decision while both methods compiled. Two methods whose difference is invisible at the call site is the defect, so it is now a single Validate returning AdminTokenResult. Touches two files from already-committed units: DatabaseMigrationExtensions (U2) gains a flush before the rethrow, or the one Critical event in the system dies with the process; AdminTokenValidator (U1) classifies why a bypass was refused. Build 0 errors; 366 backend tests pass, up from 315, and 237 frontend tests, up from 213. tsc clean, eslint clean on every changed file. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HHoJpxYXzHACSQguHrC5fw
48 lines
2.0 KiB
TypeScript
48 lines
2.0 KiB
TypeScript
import { useEffect } from 'react';
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import { getAppConfig } from '@/lib/config';
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const SCRIPT_ELEMENT_ID = 'umami-analytics-script';
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/**
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* Injects the self-hosted Umami tracking script when both the script URL and the website ID are
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* configured at build time. Renders nothing.
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*
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* A component rather than a tag in index.html, because the website ID is a build-time variable
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* and index.html cannot read import.meta.env. It also makes the "never in development" and "once
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* only" rules testable.
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*
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* `Do Not Track` is deliberately not consulted: Umami sets no cookies and collects no personal
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* data, and this SPA's audience is a known set of operators, so honouring DNT would reduce data
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* without protecting anyone. A conscious choice rather than an omission.
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*/
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export function UmamiAnalytics() {
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useEffect(() => {
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const { umamiScriptUrl, umamiWebsiteId } = getAppConfig();
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// Never in local development, regardless of configuration, so local testing does not
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// pollute the real visitor analytics.
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if (import.meta.env.DEV || !umamiScriptUrl || !umamiWebsiteId) {
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return;
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}
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if (document.getElementById(SCRIPT_ELEMENT_ID) !== null) {
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return;
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}
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const script = document.createElement('script');
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script.id = SCRIPT_ELEMENT_ID;
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script.src = umamiScriptUrl;
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script.defer = true;
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script.setAttribute('data-website-id', umamiWebsiteId);
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document.head.appendChild(script);
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// Deliberately no cleanup removing the script. Under StrictMode the double-invocation
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// would become inject -> remove -> inject, and removing the element does not unregister
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// the listeners Umami already installed — so the first page view can be counted twice.
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// This component lives for the application's lifetime and has nothing to clean up; the
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// duplicate guard above handles re-invocation on its own.
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}, []);
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return null;
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}
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