Files
slp-modular-cms/frontend/src/lib/sentry.test.ts
T
SluijsensandClaude Opus 5 8e79a72340 Makes the application say what it is doing and when it fails
U4. Console logging plus Sentry, a same-origin tunnel so ad blockers cannot
silence browser errors, Umami on the admin SPA, and six security events that
alert rules can actually be built on.

The correlation id is the W3C trace id from the ambient Activity, enabled by
one line of ActivityTrackingOptions so every entry from every category carries
it without touching a call site. It propagates across the master/slave
boundary via traceparent, which TraceIdentifier cannot do at all, and it is
the same value ProblemDetails already returns to the browser.

The security events use source-generated LoggerMessage with constant
templates. Sentry groups log events by message, so interpolating an email
address would give every address its own issue and "more than 20 failed
logins in five minutes" could never fire — the events would arrive, be
visible, be tagged, and the alerting would silently be impossible. A test
asserts the rendered message is identical across argument values.

Scrubbing happens in-process, before transmission, and covers Set-Cookie as
well as Cookie: the login response issues the refreshToken there, so
scrubbing only the request side would protect nothing. Transactions are
scrubbed too, because they carry request data and are the channel nobody
thinks of.

The tunnel derives its destination from the DSN once at startup and reads
nothing from the request, which is what separates a tunnel from a
server-side request forgery primitive. Size is capped by a bounded read
rather than by trusting Content-Length, and the endpoint is rate limited.

Two things found along the way. Zod 4's url() hands the value to the URL
constructor, which accepts any scheme — so the existing frontend validation
would have accepted the exact "htp://" typo BR-U4-24 names, and the SPA
would have called a nonexistent origin. Now constrained to http(s). And the
new appsettings comments are verified against the real configuration
provider, because the failure mode if it rejected them is both hosts
refusing to start after a release switch.

One deviation. IAdminTokenValidator was meant to gain a reason-reporting
overload; implemented that way, a substitute returning false by default
silently inverted the access decision while both methods compiled. Two
methods whose difference is invisible at the call site is the defect, so it
is now a single Validate returning AdminTokenResult.

Touches two files from already-committed units: DatabaseMigrationExtensions
(U2) gains a flush before the rethrow, or the one Critical event in the
system dies with the process; AdminTokenValidator (U1) classifies why a
bypass was refused.

Build 0 errors; 366 backend tests pass, up from 315, and 237 frontend tests,
up from 213. tsc clean, eslint clean on every changed file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HHoJpxYXzHACSQguHrC5fw
2026-07-28 11:25:54 +02:00

73 lines
2.5 KiB
TypeScript

import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
import * as Sentry from '@sentry/react';
import { SENTRY_TUNNEL_PATH, initSentry } from '@/lib/sentry';
import { resetAppConfigCache } from '@/lib/config';
// ESM namespace objects are not configurable, so Sentry.init cannot be spied on in place.
vi.mock('@sentry/react', () => ({ init: vi.fn() }));
const init = vi.mocked(Sentry.init);
describe('initSentry', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
resetAppConfigCache();
init.mockClear();
});
afterEach(() => {
vi.unstubAllEnvs();
resetAppConfigCache();
});
it('does nothing without a DSN, so local development is unaffected', () => {
vi.stubEnv('VITE_SENTRY_DSN', undefined as unknown as string);
initSentry();
expect(init).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it('does nothing when the DSN is an empty string', () => {
vi.stubEnv('VITE_SENTRY_DSN', '');
initSentry();
expect(init).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
/**
* The tunnel is the whole reason browser reporting survives an ad blocker: a direct ingest URL
* is blocked with ERR_BLOCKED_BY_CLIENT, losing errors precisely for the users who have one.
*/
it('routes through the same-origin tunnel rather than a Sentry ingest URL', () => {
vi.stubEnv('VITE_SENTRY_DSN', 'https://abc@o1.ingest.de.sentry.io/42');
initSentry();
expect(init).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
const options = init.mock.calls[0][0]!;
expect(options.tunnel).toBe(SENTRY_TUNNEL_PATH);
expect(options.tunnel).not.toContain('sentry.io');
});
it('tags the environment and the release, and keeps PII off', () => {
vi.stubEnv('VITE_SENTRY_DSN', 'https://abc@o1.ingest.de.sentry.io/42');
vi.stubEnv('VITE_APP_ENV', 'test');
initSentry();
const options = init.mock.calls[0][0]!;
expect(options.environment).toBe('test');
expect(options.release).toBeTruthy();
// False on the frontend even though the backend enables it with scrubbing: the browser
// offers no equivalent in-process guarantee, and there is nothing here the backend cannot
// already report.
expect(options.sendDefaultPii).toBe(false);
});
it('uses the same tunnel path the API serves and the dev proxy mirrors', () => {
expect(SENTRY_TUNNEL_PATH).toBe('/sentry-tunnel');
expect(SENTRY_TUNNEL_PATH).not.toMatch(/^\/api\//);
});
});