Commit Graph
5 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
SluijsensandClaude Sonnet 5.5 5378c21799 Contact: captcha-regio (global/eu) in de token-response en frame-src voor de StrictSite-CSP (CMS-U9 vervolg)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-10 23:11:07 +01:00
SluijsensandClaude Sonnet 5.5 7d21d9024a Voeg WebsiteMode.PrerenderedPages toe: nginx-gelijke serving van een voorgerenderde website
- Pure WebsitePathResolver (canonieke 301's, echte 404, dotfiles geweigerd, gereserveerde prefixes)
- PrerenderedSiteMiddleware, 404-fallback na de API-routes, gzip, Cache-Control, NoIndex/robots.txt
- Beleid StrictSite met eigen AllowedSite*Origins; volledige headerset op alle websiteresponses
- Tests: voorbeelden, FsCheck-properties en integratietests op een in-memory server

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-06 15:52:04 +01:00
SluijsensandClaude Opus 5 8e79a72340 Makes the application say what it is doing and when it fails
U4. Console logging plus Sentry, a same-origin tunnel so ad blockers cannot
silence browser errors, Umami on the admin SPA, and six security events that
alert rules can actually be built on.

The correlation id is the W3C trace id from the ambient Activity, enabled by
one line of ActivityTrackingOptions so every entry from every category carries
it without touching a call site. It propagates across the master/slave
boundary via traceparent, which TraceIdentifier cannot do at all, and it is
the same value ProblemDetails already returns to the browser.

The security events use source-generated LoggerMessage with constant
templates. Sentry groups log events by message, so interpolating an email
address would give every address its own issue and "more than 20 failed
logins in five minutes" could never fire — the events would arrive, be
visible, be tagged, and the alerting would silently be impossible. A test
asserts the rendered message is identical across argument values.

Scrubbing happens in-process, before transmission, and covers Set-Cookie as
well as Cookie: the login response issues the refreshToken there, so
scrubbing only the request side would protect nothing. Transactions are
scrubbed too, because they carry request data and are the channel nobody
thinks of.

The tunnel derives its destination from the DSN once at startup and reads
nothing from the request, which is what separates a tunnel from a
server-side request forgery primitive. Size is capped by a bounded read
rather than by trusting Content-Length, and the endpoint is rate limited.

Two things found along the way. Zod 4's url() hands the value to the URL
constructor, which accepts any scheme — so the existing frontend validation
would have accepted the exact "htp://" typo BR-U4-24 names, and the SPA
would have called a nonexistent origin. Now constrained to http(s). And the
new appsettings comments are verified against the real configuration
provider, because the failure mode if it rejected them is both hosts
refusing to start after a release switch.

One deviation. IAdminTokenValidator was meant to gain a reason-reporting
overload; implemented that way, a substitute returning false by default
silently inverted the access decision while both methods compiled. Two
methods whose difference is invisible at the call site is the defect, so it
is now a single Validate returning AdminTokenResult.

Touches two files from already-committed units: DatabaseMigrationExtensions
(U2) gains a flush before the rethrow, or the one Critical event in the
system dies with the process; AdminTokenValidator (U1) classifies why a
bypass was refused.

Build 0 errors; 366 backend tests pass, up from 315, and 237 frontend tests,
up from 213. tsc clean, eslint clean on every changed file.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HHoJpxYXzHACSQguHrC5fw
2026-07-28 11:25:54 +02:00
SluijsensandClaude Opus 5 a122548454 Sends the security headers from the application instead of the proxy
U3. These headers normally come from nginx, but the deployment target does
not allow server configuration, so the application emits them itself. That
changes the failure mode: a bad nginx config fails loudly at reload, while a
middleware that never runs sends nothing and says nothing.

Two policies, defined in code. Strict for /admin, /api/v1 and /health;
relaxed for the public website, which is authored elsewhere by someone who
has never seen this policy. Configuration decides where a policy applies and
which external origins are permitted; it cannot invent a policy that is
subtly permissive.

script-src 'self' under Strict has no 'unsafe-inline' and no 'unsafe-eval',
asserted by a test so that loosening it means deleting a test that says why.
style-src does carry 'unsafe-inline' and cannot not: Radix positions its
overlays with inline style attributes, which nonces cannot reach at all.

Two traps handled explicitly. StartsWithSegments rather than string
StartsWith, because "/administrator".StartsWith("/admin") is true and a
public page would silently lose its inline scripts with no server-side trace.
And all decision logic sits in a static writer rather than in the middleware,
because DefaultHttpContext.Response.OnStarting is a no-op — the obvious
middleware test observes nothing and an assertion that nothing was written
passes for entirely the wrong reason.

An unknown policy name fails ValidateOnStart, so the process exits rather
than quietly serving /admin under the relaxed policy. Origin format is
validated too, beyond what the design asked: a CSP source list silently
ignores a malformed source, so a URL with a path would look configured and
block the script anyway.

BR-U3-22's Umami startup warning is withdrawn (REF-U3-01) — the backend
never sees VITE_UMAMI_WEBSITE_ID. It becomes a blocking CI gate in U5.

Build 0 errors; 315 tests pass, up from 253.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HHoJpxYXzHACSQguHrC5fw
2026-07-28 10:58:45 +02:00
SluijsensandClaude Opus 5 29a93ef873 Separates website and admin roots, adds /health, hardens the availability gate
Prepares the single-host layout for deployment. The customer's public
website moves from wwwroot/ to wwwroot/web/, so a CMS deploy can no
longer overwrite content it does not own: with the website in its own
directory, the release directory can be swapped without touching it.

Each front-end gets its own file provider, and both tolerate a missing
directory at startup — a fresh deployment has no website until a
separate workspace deploys one, and the CMS must still serve /admin and
the API. When the website's index.html is absent, an embedded
placeholder is served instead of a 404, which also doubles as proof the
CMS itself is running. The placeholder is embedded in the assembly
rather than shipped into wwwroot/web/, because that directory is owned
and overwritten by the website workspace.

Adds GET /health for uptime monitoring. It reports infrastructure
liveness only and is deliberately NOT the same thing as
/api/v1/Availability/status or /api/v1/System/capabilities: those are
CMS domain state that also serve the master/slave protocol. A healthy
instance can be switched off by design, and a switched-on instance can
be unhealthy, so conflating them would alert on business state and stay
silent on real outages. /health is on the availability gate's bypass
list for the same reason.

Fixes a real defect in the gate's admin bypass. It parsed the bearer
token with ReadJwtToken, which reads claims without verifying the
signature, so an unauthenticated caller could forge an unsigned token
carrying an Owner role claim and bypass the gate that suspends a
customer's site. Protected endpoints still rejected them, so nothing
leaked — but the gate itself was bypassable. The token is now fully
validated against the same parameters as the bearer scheme, resolved
from one shared source so the two cannot drift apart.

Host wiring for these changes lands with the data-durability commit,
since both units touch the same lines of Program.cs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HHoJpxYXzHACSQguHrC5fw
2026-07-28 00:00:13 +02:00