U4. Console logging plus Sentry, a same-origin tunnel so ad blockers cannot
silence browser errors, Umami on the admin SPA, and six security events that
alert rules can actually be built on.
The correlation id is the W3C trace id from the ambient Activity, enabled by
one line of ActivityTrackingOptions so every entry from every category carries
it without touching a call site. It propagates across the master/slave
boundary via traceparent, which TraceIdentifier cannot do at all, and it is
the same value ProblemDetails already returns to the browser.
The security events use source-generated LoggerMessage with constant
templates. Sentry groups log events by message, so interpolating an email
address would give every address its own issue and "more than 20 failed
logins in five minutes" could never fire — the events would arrive, be
visible, be tagged, and the alerting would silently be impossible. A test
asserts the rendered message is identical across argument values.
Scrubbing happens in-process, before transmission, and covers Set-Cookie as
well as Cookie: the login response issues the refreshToken there, so
scrubbing only the request side would protect nothing. Transactions are
scrubbed too, because they carry request data and are the channel nobody
thinks of.
The tunnel derives its destination from the DSN once at startup and reads
nothing from the request, which is what separates a tunnel from a
server-side request forgery primitive. Size is capped by a bounded read
rather than by trusting Content-Length, and the endpoint is rate limited.
Two things found along the way. Zod 4's url() hands the value to the URL
constructor, which accepts any scheme — so the existing frontend validation
would have accepted the exact "htp://" typo BR-U4-24 names, and the SPA
would have called a nonexistent origin. Now constrained to http(s). And the
new appsettings comments are verified against the real configuration
provider, because the failure mode if it rejected them is both hosts
refusing to start after a release switch.
One deviation. IAdminTokenValidator was meant to gain a reason-reporting
overload; implemented that way, a substitute returning false by default
silently inverted the access decision while both methods compiled. Two
methods whose difference is invisible at the call site is the defect, so it
is now a single Validate returning AdminTokenResult.
Touches two files from already-committed units: DatabaseMigrationExtensions
(U2) gains a flush before the rethrow, or the one Critical event in the
system dies with the process; AdminTokenValidator (U1) classifies why a
bypass was refused.
Build 0 errors; 366 backend tests pass, up from 315, and 237 frontend tests,
up from 213. tsc clean, eslint clean on every changed file.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HHoJpxYXzHACSQguHrC5fw
Shared hosting (e.g. mijnhostingpartner.nl) typically allows only one
site/app-pool, so SlpModularCms.Api now serves everything itself:
'/' for the customer's public website (deployed separately, not part
of this repo), '/admin' for the CMS admin SPA, and '/api/v1' for the
API as before.
- Program.cs: static files from wwwroot + SPA fallbacks per path so
client-side routing works for both frontends.
- frontend/: builds with base '/admin/' in production (dev unchanged),
router basepath follows suit.
- SlpModularCms.Api.csproj: publish now builds the admin frontend and
copies its output into wwwroot/admin automatically.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Wi5qHAuq8UbzN4NLUFeKkJ
Chrome 89+ schemeful same-site treats http://localhost and https://localhost
as different sites, blocking SameSite=Strict cookies on cross-origin fetch
(e.g. Vite on port 5173, API on port 7221).
Fix: make CookieSameSite configurable per environment in JwtSettings.
- Default: Strict (production)
- appsettings.Development.json: None (allows cross-origin cookie in dev)
- When SameSite=None, Secure is always forced (browser requirement)
Revert the earlier Vite proxy approach in favour of this backend config.
VITE_API_BASE_URL remains a freely configurable URL in .env.local.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Chrome 89+ treats http://localhost and https://localhost as different sites
(schemeful same-site). The refreshToken cookie (SameSite=Strict) was not
sent when the Vite dev server (HTTP) made cross-origin fetch calls to the
.NET backend (HTTPS), causing a 401 on every page reload.
Fix: route /api/* through the Vite dev server proxy so all requests stay
same-origin. The cookie is now always sent and auth sessions survive reloads.
- vite.config.ts: proxy /api → https://localhost:7221 (secure:false for dev cert)
- .env.example: document proxy vs direct mode, set default VITE_API_BASE_URL to empty
- config.ts: accept empty string as valid apiBaseUrl alongside full URLs
Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
SluijsensandClaude Opus 5