Makes the application say what it is doing and when it fails
U4. Console logging plus Sentry, a same-origin tunnel so ad blockers cannot silence browser errors, Umami on the admin SPA, and six security events that alert rules can actually be built on. The correlation id is the W3C trace id from the ambient Activity, enabled by one line of ActivityTrackingOptions so every entry from every category carries it without touching a call site. It propagates across the master/slave boundary via traceparent, which TraceIdentifier cannot do at all, and it is the same value ProblemDetails already returns to the browser. The security events use source-generated LoggerMessage with constant templates. Sentry groups log events by message, so interpolating an email address would give every address its own issue and "more than 20 failed logins in five minutes" could never fire — the events would arrive, be visible, be tagged, and the alerting would silently be impossible. A test asserts the rendered message is identical across argument values. Scrubbing happens in-process, before transmission, and covers Set-Cookie as well as Cookie: the login response issues the refreshToken there, so scrubbing only the request side would protect nothing. Transactions are scrubbed too, because they carry request data and are the channel nobody thinks of. The tunnel derives its destination from the DSN once at startup and reads nothing from the request, which is what separates a tunnel from a server-side request forgery primitive. Size is capped by a bounded read rather than by trusting Content-Length, and the endpoint is rate limited. Two things found along the way. Zod 4's url() hands the value to the URL constructor, which accepts any scheme — so the existing frontend validation would have accepted the exact "htp://" typo BR-U4-24 names, and the SPA would have called a nonexistent origin. Now constrained to http(s). And the new appsettings comments are verified against the real configuration provider, because the failure mode if it rejected them is both hosts refusing to start after a release switch. One deviation. IAdminTokenValidator was meant to gain a reason-reporting overload; implemented that way, a substitute returning false by default silently inverted the access decision while both methods compiled. Two methods whose difference is invisible at the call site is the defect, so it is now a single Validate returning AdminTokenResult. Touches two files from already-committed units: DatabaseMigrationExtensions (U2) gains a flush before the rethrow, or the one Critical event in the system dies with the process; AdminTokenValidator (U1) classifies why a bypass was refused. Build 0 errors; 366 backend tests pass, up from 315, and 237 frontend tests, up from 213. tsc clean, eslint clean on every changed file. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HHoJpxYXzHACSQguHrC5fw
This commit is contained in:
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
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using System.IdentityModel.Tokens.Jwt;
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using System.Security.Claims;
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using Microsoft.IdentityModel.Tokens;
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using SlpModularCms.Core.Observability;
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namespace SlpModularCms.Core.Hosting.Security;
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@@ -30,18 +31,18 @@ public sealed class AdminTokenValidator : IAdminTokenValidator
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_validationParameters = validationParameters ?? throw new ArgumentNullException(nameof(validationParameters));
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}
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public bool IsVerifiedAdmin(string? authorizationHeader)
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public AdminTokenResult Validate(string? authorizationHeader)
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{
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if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(authorizationHeader) ||
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!authorizationHeader.StartsWith(BearerPrefix, StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase))
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{
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return false;
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return Rejected(BypassRejectionReason.Absent);
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}
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var token = authorizationHeader[BearerPrefix.Length..].Trim();
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if (token.Length == 0)
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{
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return false;
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return Rejected(BypassRejectionReason.Absent);
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}
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ClaimsPrincipal principal;
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@@ -52,13 +53,34 @@ public sealed class AdminTokenValidator : IAdminTokenValidator
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// whether to serve is this component's job; returning 401 is not.
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principal = _handler.ValidateToken(token, _validationParameters, out _);
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}
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catch (Exception)
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catch (Exception ex)
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{
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return false;
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return Rejected(Classify(ex));
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}
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return AdminRoles.Any(role => principal.IsInRole(role))
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|| principal.FindAll(ClaimTypes.Role).Any(c => AdminRoles.Contains(c.Value))
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|| principal.FindAll("role").Any(c => AdminRoles.Contains(c.Value));
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var isAdmin = AdminRoles.Any(role => principal.IsInRole(role))
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|| principal.FindAll(ClaimTypes.Role).Any(c => AdminRoles.Contains(c.Value))
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|| principal.FindAll("role").Any(c => AdminRoles.Contains(c.Value));
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return isAdmin
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? new AdminTokenResult(true, default)
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: Rejected(BypassRejectionReason.NotAdmin);
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}
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private static AdminTokenResult Rejected(BypassRejectionReason reason) => new(false, reason);
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/// <summary>
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/// Maps a validation exception onto a reason class. The exception type is the only thing
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/// inspected — never the token, and never the exception message, which can quote it.
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/// </summary>
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private static BypassRejectionReason Classify(Exception exception) => exception switch
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{
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SecurityTokenExpiredException => BypassRejectionReason.Expired,
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// Covers SecurityTokenSignatureKeyNotFoundException too, which derives from it — a key
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// that cannot be found and a signature that does not verify are the same signal here.
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SecurityTokenInvalidSignatureException => BypassRejectionReason.InvalidSignature,
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SecurityTokenInvalidIssuerException => BypassRejectionReason.WrongIssuer,
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SecurityTokenInvalidAudienceException => BypassRejectionReason.WrongAudience,
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_ => BypassRejectionReason.Malformed
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};
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}
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@@ -1,5 +1,17 @@
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using SlpModularCms.Core.Observability;
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namespace SlpModularCms.Core.Hosting.Security;
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/// <summary>
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/// Outcome of validating an admin bypass token.
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/// </summary>
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/// <param name="IsVerifiedAdmin">True only for a fully valid Owner or Administrator token.</param>
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/// <param name="Reason">
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/// Why a rejected token was rejected; meaningless when <paramref name="IsVerifiedAdmin"/> is true.
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/// Never the token or any part of it.
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/// </param>
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public readonly record struct AdminTokenResult(bool IsVerifiedAdmin, BypassRejectionReason Reason);
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/// <summary>
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/// Decides whether a request carries a genuinely valid Owner or Administrator token.
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/// </summary>
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@@ -12,13 +24,25 @@ namespace SlpModularCms.Core.Hosting.Security;
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public interface IAdminTokenValidator
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{
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/// <summary>
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/// Returns true only when the supplied Authorization header contains a bearer token that
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/// validates successfully and carries the Owner or Administrator role.
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/// Validates the supplied Authorization header and reports both the decision and, on
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/// rejection, its cause.
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/// </summary>
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/// <param name="authorizationHeader">Raw Authorization header value; may be null or empty.</param>
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/// <returns>
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/// True when the caller is a verified Owner or Administrator; false in every other case,
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/// including an absent, malformed, forged, expired or non-admin token. Never throws.
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/// A verified-admin result only for a bearer token that validates successfully and carries the
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/// Owner or Administrator role. Every other case — absent, malformed, forged, expired or
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/// non-admin — is a rejection with a reason. Never throws.
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/// </returns>
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bool IsVerifiedAdmin(string? authorizationHeader);
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/// <remarks>
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/// <b>Deliberately the only method on this interface.</b> An earlier shape had a plain
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/// boolean overload alongside this one, and the difference was invisible at a call site: a
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/// caller using the boolean form got the right access decision and silently emitted no
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/// security event. One method means the reason cannot be skipped by accident.
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///
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/// The reason class matters operationally:
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/// <see cref="BypassRejectionReason.InvalidSignature"/> suggests forgery, while
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/// <see cref="BypassRejectionReason.Expired"/> is usually an administrator with a stale tab,
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/// and an alert that cannot tell those apart is one nobody acts on.
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/// </remarks>
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AdminTokenResult Validate(string? authorizationHeader);
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}
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