# Infrastructure Design — contact-form (U4) The frontend introduces **no new infrastructure**. The form needs only the same-origin API prefix that the offerings call already uses. ## Confirmed - The example nginx configs in `aidlc-docs/features/react-frontend/operations/deployment/nginx/` only show `/` to the web server and `/sentry-tunnel`; they contain **no `/api/v1/` location and no security-header directives**. That repository documentation may be outdated compared with the real Pi configuration. - The user: SLP Software already has an API that does not have to move. - The session "CMS & API" (2026-11-10): the release going to production now contains **no** contact routes; they arrive with the contact feature and are switched on in production only after Bryan's go. ## Confirmed later the same day (via "CMS & API", from Pi-Main and the CMS code at 2818b74) - The SLP .NET apps listen on Pi-Main: **test `:5100`, production `:5101`** (0.0.0.0, ufw only allows 192.168.1.102, the proxy Pi "Pi-Entry"). TLS ends on Pi-Entry; the app sees `http` with `Host: test.slpsoftware.nl` / `slpsoftware.nl`. - Pi-Main's journal shows requests under both `/api/v1` and `/` reaching the same .NET app, so `/api/v1/` evidently reaches the app on test; the real Pi-Entry config is not visible to the AI sessions. - Pi-Main's nginx sets **no security headers** for the SLP sites (only `Cache-Control: public` on static assets). The **CMS host sets them itself** (`SecurityHeadersMiddleware`, options `SecurityHeaders`: Enabled, DefaultPolicy Relaxed, PathPolicies with `/admin`, `/api/v1`, `/health` = Strict, AllowedScriptOrigins, AllowedConnectOrigins; CSP definitions in code; `TryAdd`, so headers set earlier by nginx win). Pi-Entry may set headers too (unknown). - `Api.SlpSoftware` serves `/` only as SPA fallback from `wwwroot/web` when present (WebsiteMode SpaFallback); only the Andrea host runs PrerenderedPages. ## Still unconfirmed (do not treat as fact) - Which application delivers the public pages of slpsoftware.nl today (the CMS `wwwroot/web` fallback or a separate static web server) and therefore which header policy applies to the HTML of this site; the site CSP below applies to that delivering server (for the CMS host: `SecurityHeaders:DefaultPolicy` and `AllowedScriptOrigins`/`AllowedConnectOrigins` must allow the Umami host). - The Pi-Entry configuration (routing of `/api/v1/` vs `/`, headers). To be confirmed by the user; the form itself only needs `connect-src 'self'` because `/api/v1` is on the same host. ## Required configuration (for deployment / Operations list) 1. **Reverse proxy**: `/api/v1/` must be forwarded as a prefix to the existing SLP API (no new route if that is already the case), preserving `Host`, `X-Forwarded-For`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`; request body limit of at least 32 KB; no response caching for `/api/v1/offerings` and `/api/v1/contact-messages*`. The API needs the real client IP for per-client rate limiting (`ForwardedHeaders:KnownProxies` on the API host). 2. **Security headers (SECURITY-04)** on HTML responses, if not present yet: `Content-Security-Policy` (e.g. `default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' ; connect-src 'self' ; img-src 'self' data:; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; font-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'`), `Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains`, `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, `X-Frame-Options: DENY`, `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin`. The form itself needs only `connect-src 'self'`; fonts are self-hosted; `/theme-init.js` is same-origin. `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` is needed for inline style attributes (progress bars) and is an accepted, documented exception until those are replaced. 3. **Environment**: no new variables. `VITE_API_BASE_URL` stays a local-development override only. 4. **Switches**: the form appears only when the CMS host switch `Contact:Enabled` and the CMS switch are both on (token route answers 200); enabling is an Operations step after per-client rate limiting is on the API host. 5. **Observability**: Umami events `contact-sent` / `contact-failed` (no data); Sentry without bodies; reverse-proxy access logging is an Operations item (SECURITY-02). ## Security Baseline — Infrastructure scope SECURITY-04: **open until confirmed** (unknown whether the real servers set the headers; the repository examples do not). Tracked for Operations (still undecided) and flagged to the user. SECURITY-07: only 80/443 exposed by the reverse proxy; the API upstream stays internal. Other rules N/A for this unit.