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AndreaSlopFotografie/aidlc-docs/features/prerendering/construction/build-and-test/security-test-instructions.md
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Security Test Instructions

Feature: prerendering. HEAD 39dc456; CI run 599 on 2006fa0.

Purpose

Check the dependencies, the HTTP security headers, the redirect and path handling of the server rules, and the no-inline-script rule of the prerendered HTML. The Security Baseline extension is enabled (aidlc-state.md, Extension Configuration: Security Baseline = Yes). The per-rule tables are in construction/hosting-and-targets/infrastructure-design/infrastructure-design.md § 15 and the business rules of units 1 and 2.

Security Test Scope

  • Dependency audit (production): pnpm audit:deps (pnpm audit --prod --audit-level high), blocking. It is a step of the CI check job, which was green in run 599.
  • Dependency audit (development tools): pnpm audit:dev, non-blocking by design (NFR-SEC-05, the script ends with an echo fallback).
  • No inline executable script: externalizeInlineScripts.ts fails the build on an inline script, an on*= attribute or a javascript: link; e2e/rawHtml.e2e.ts re-checks the raw HTML. The CSP (script-src 'self' plus Umami) is unchanged by this feature.
  • E-mail address not in the output: the address is in no output file (the script runner checks it); the main session confirmed no address in the HTML of /over-mij on the test server.
  • Server rules: security headers on every response, open redirect, path traversal, directory listing.
  • Deploy scripts: unsafe target folders, invalid artifact, fail-closed verification.
  • Raw HTML injection: grep -rn "dangerouslySetInnerHTML" src config public.

Run Security Tests

1. Dependency Audits

cd web
pnpm audit:deps
pnpm audit:dev
  • pnpm audit:deps: passed in the check job of CI run 599 (the job is green, the step is blocking). No new production dependency was added by unit 3; unit 1 added @tanstack/react-start and its tree, with the zod@4 override against GHSA-mrhx-c7xc-m3w5.
  • pnpm audit:dev: the figures differ by unit and were not re-run in this stage. Unit 1: the same severity counts as master (low 2, moderate 10, high 11, critical 0). Unit 3 Step 21: 23 advisories, non-blocking. Findings are in development tools only and not in the shipped bundle.
  • Result: production audit pass; development audit reports advisories (non-blocking, as on master).

2. Security Headers, Redirects and Paths (real nginx)

cd web
pnpm e2e

In CI run 599, e2e/serverRules.e2e.ts (198 tests, real nginx 1.24.0) and e2e/urls.e2e.ts (12) passed. They check:

  • the five security headers on 200, 301, 404 and the 404 page (SECURITY-04), including the server-level if redirects;
  • exactly one Cache-Control per response;
  • an open redirect cannot be built: //evil.example/ and /%5Cevil.example/ are tested (BR-HST-06); /%5Cevil.example/ gives 404 and no Location to another host. The %5C case was a real defect in the first generator (Location: /evil.example), found by this suite in CI and fixed;
  • no directory listing, no index fallback to the home page, /assets is not served as a directory (BR-HST-07);
  • the preview server and nginx answer the same on generated paths (P-HST-09).

On the test server (run 598, curl checks by the main session): security headers present, /%5Cevil.example/ returns 404, no e-mail address in /over-mij.

Not verified: the IIS rules (generated text only, no host), and nginx 1.30.6 on the Pi beyond Pi-Main's check of the config without root (pi-install-instructions.md). The Pi sends Server: nginx/<version>; server_tokens is a Pi-level setting outside the generated file.

3. Deploy Script Checks

e2e/deployScripts.e2e.ts (47 tests, passed in run 599) covers: refusal of unsafe target folders and of an invalid build before anything is uploaded, TLS requirements and no backup files in every lftp session, verify-deployment.sh failing on each missing security header and on the old SPA behaviour. Not tested: FTPS against a real host (login, certificate, directory layout).

4. Raw HTML Injection Check

cd web
grep -rn "dangerouslySetInnerHTML" src config public
  • Expected: one code use, the JSON-LD script of StructuredData.
  • Verified at HEAD (this stage): src/components/StructuredData/StructuredData.tsx:15 (dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: jsonLdScript(data) }}, escaping <, > and &) and the comment on line 8. No other match outside tests.

5. Security Baseline Extension

  • Status: enabled.
  • Compliance (from the design documents; the implementation proofs are the tests above):
    • SECURITY-04 (headers): compliant, proven with real nginx.
    • SECURITY-09 (hardening, no listing, no stack traces): compliant by design and by the nginx tests.
    • SECURITY-10 (supply chain): compliant for the production audit and the frozen lockfile; the development audit reports non-blocking advisories.
    • SECURITY-11 (secure design: path traversal, open redirect, CRLF): compliant, covered by P-HST-01, P-HST-04, P-HST-07.
    • SECURITY-13 (integrity): compliant, no external script; the audit route is opt-in and not on production hosts.
    • SECURITY-15 (fail-safe): compliant; a prerender error fails the build, the post-deploy script fails closed, the artifact check stops an upload.
    • Other rules (data stores, APIs, accounts, logging): N/A, static site.
  • Residual: IIS rules and FTPS are unverified; the repository appears anonymously readable from the Pi (see the summary, open items).