# Security Test Instructions Feature: prerendering. HEAD `39dc456`; CI run 599 on `2006fa0`. ## Purpose Check the dependencies, the HTTP security headers, the redirect and path handling of the server rules, and the no-inline-script rule of the prerendered HTML. The Security Baseline extension is enabled (`aidlc-state.md`, Extension Configuration: Security Baseline = Yes). The per-rule tables are in `construction/hosting-and-targets/infrastructure-design/infrastructure-design.md` ยง 15 and the business rules of units 1 and 2. ## Security Test Scope - **Dependency audit (production)**: `pnpm audit:deps` (`pnpm audit --prod --audit-level high`), blocking. It is a step of the CI `check` job, which was green in run 599. - **Dependency audit (development tools)**: `pnpm audit:dev`, non-blocking by design (NFR-SEC-05, the script ends with an `echo` fallback). - **No inline executable script**: `externalizeInlineScripts.ts` fails the build on an inline script, an `on*=` attribute or a `javascript:` link; `e2e/rawHtml.e2e.ts` re-checks the raw HTML. The CSP (`script-src 'self'` plus Umami) is unchanged by this feature. - **E-mail address not in the output**: the address is in no output file (the script runner checks it); the main session confirmed no address in the HTML of `/over-mij` on the test server. - **Server rules**: security headers on every response, open redirect, path traversal, directory listing. - **Deploy scripts**: unsafe target folders, invalid artifact, fail-closed verification. - **Raw HTML injection**: `grep -rn "dangerouslySetInnerHTML" src config public`. ## Run Security Tests ### 1. Dependency Audits ```bash cd web pnpm audit:deps pnpm audit:dev ``` - **`pnpm audit:deps`**: passed in the `check` job of CI run 599 (the job is green, the step is blocking). No new production dependency was added by unit 3; unit 1 added `@tanstack/react-start` and its tree, with the `zod@4` override against GHSA-mrhx-c7xc-m3w5. - **`pnpm audit:dev`**: the figures differ by unit and were not re-run in this stage. Unit 1: the same severity counts as master (low 2, moderate 10, high 11, critical 0). Unit 3 Step 21: 23 advisories, non-blocking. Findings are in development tools only and not in the shipped bundle. - **Result**: production audit pass; development audit reports advisories (non-blocking, as on master). ### 2. Security Headers, Redirects and Paths (real nginx) ```bash cd web pnpm e2e ``` In CI run 599, `e2e/serverRules.e2e.ts` (198 tests, real nginx 1.24.0) and `e2e/urls.e2e.ts` (12) passed. They check: - the five security headers on 200, 301, 404 and the 404 page (SECURITY-04), including the server-level `if` redirects; - exactly one `Cache-Control` per response; - an open redirect cannot be built: `//evil.example/` and `/%5Cevil.example/` are tested (BR-HST-06); `/%5Cevil.example/` gives 404 and no `Location` to another host. The `%5C` case was a real defect in the first generator (`Location: /evil.example`), found by this suite in CI and fixed; - no directory listing, no `index` fallback to the home page, `/assets` is not served as a directory (BR-HST-07); - the preview server and nginx answer the same on generated paths (P-HST-09). On the test server (run 598, curl checks by the main session): security headers present, `/%5Cevil.example/` returns 404, no e-mail address in `/over-mij`. Not verified: the IIS rules (generated text only, no host), and nginx 1.30.6 on the Pi beyond Pi-Main's check of the config without root (`pi-install-instructions.md`). The Pi sends `Server: nginx/`; `server_tokens` is a Pi-level setting outside the generated file. ### 3. Deploy Script Checks `e2e/deployScripts.e2e.ts` (47 tests, passed in run 599) covers: refusal of unsafe target folders and of an invalid build before anything is uploaded, TLS requirements and no backup files in every lftp session, `verify-deployment.sh` failing on each missing security header and on the old SPA behaviour. Not tested: FTPS against a real host (login, certificate, directory layout). ### 4. Raw HTML Injection Check ```bash cd web grep -rn "dangerouslySetInnerHTML" src config public ``` - **Expected**: one code use, the JSON-LD script of `StructuredData`. - **Verified at HEAD** (this stage): `src/components/StructuredData/StructuredData.tsx:15` (`dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: jsonLdScript(data) }}`, escaping `<`, `>` and `&`) and the comment on line 8. No other match outside tests. ### 5. Security Baseline Extension - **Status**: enabled. - **Compliance** (from the design documents; the implementation proofs are the tests above): - SECURITY-04 (headers): compliant, proven with real nginx. - SECURITY-09 (hardening, no listing, no stack traces): compliant by design and by the nginx tests. - SECURITY-10 (supply chain): compliant for the production audit and the frozen lockfile; the development audit reports non-blocking advisories. - SECURITY-11 (secure design: path traversal, open redirect, CRLF): compliant, covered by P-HST-01, P-HST-04, P-HST-07. - SECURITY-13 (integrity): compliant, no external script; the audit route is opt-in and not on production hosts. - SECURITY-15 (fail-safe): compliant; a prerender error fails the build, the post-deploy script fails closed, the artifact check stops an upload. - Other rules (data stores, APIs, accounts, logging): N/A, static site. - **Residual**: IIS rules and FTPS are unverified; the repository appears anonymously readable from the Pi (see the summary, open items).